联储会议-历史将会重演？关于再次降息50点的论证（国外论坛转，已译，有参考价值）
今天看到一篇文章，先不论是否可靠，但是分析还是有一定参考价值的。我已翻译，同时附上原文，供大家参考。Fed meeting - History to repeat itself? An argument for a 50bps interest rate cut
联储会议-历史将会重演？关于再次降息50点的论证
- Summary: Ben Bernanke is obsessed with history. He has spent much of his academic career studying the Great Depression, and he has often described himself as a Great Depression buff. As we will explain in this note, his aggressive 50bps rate cut at this year's September 18 meeting offers more evidence of his reliance on historical lessons. The U.S. economy is being challenged by a significant construction decline, increasing the chances of a U.S. recession. All recessions have been accompanied by construction declines, but not all construction declines resulted in recessions. In both 1967 and 1995, there were year-over-year declines in residential construction, but the U.S. escaped recessions. Bernanke obviously wants a repeat of the 1995 situation, and given his obsession with history it seems likely that he would use the 1995 Fed reaction as a blueprint for his near-term decisions. If this is the case, Bernanke may be more aggressive about cutting interest rates than markets currently expect.
概览：联储主席，本南柯正沉迷于历史。这位在学术生涯中长期研究“大萧条”的学者经常把自己比作驾驭萧条的好手。在今年9月18日的联储会议上，他所做的降息50点的激进决定证明了他对历史经验的依赖。美国经济正迎来房地产的严重下滑，增加了经济全面萧条的可能性。历史上美国所有的经济萧条都伴随着房地产的下滑，但是并不是所有的地产业下滑都会引起经济的萧条。例如，在1967年和1995年，房产业经历了多年的下滑，但是美国经济躲过了萧条。本南柯显然希望重复1995年的奇迹，而且由于他对历史经验的绝对信服，似乎表明他将会用1995年的联储的措施作为自己近期行动的纲领。如果事实如此，那么本南柯也许会在这次降息上比市场预期的走的更远。
**Unexpected 50bps rate cut on September 18 shows that Bernanke is applying the lessons learned from history**
- In August 1998 the Russian debt default and the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in America led to the same sort of financial disruption seen recently in response to the sub-prime mortgage mess. The Fed did not initially respond aggressively with cuts in interest rates, only cutting by 25bps at the September 1998 meeting. In the weeks leading up to the September 1998 meeting stock markets had an anticipatory rally, expecting a rate cut (similar to what we saw ahead of this year's September 18 meeting), but sold off when the FOMC 'only' cut by 25bps. Panic returned to markets, and two weeks later Fed chairman Greenspan was forced to call an emergency meeting and cut rates again, by another 25bps.
“上次超出预期的50点降息预示本南柯正以史为鉴”
1998年的8月，由于俄国债务违约导致长期资本基金崩盘引发的金融震荡似乎和近期次级债引发的危机相似。那时，联储起初并没有马上积极降息，只是在当时9月的联储会议上降了25点。降息前的一周内，股市对于降息有很大期待（和今年9.18会议前类似），但是联储仅仅降息25点的决定严重打击市场，导致市场争相抛售。市场再度恐慌，两周后联储主席格林斯潘不得不举行紧急会议再度降息25点。
- Some have suggested Bernanke learned from Greenspan's experience of 1998 (i.e. cut by 50bps immediately as opposed to two separate cuts of 25bps).
- Bottom line: Bernanke's unexpected, aggressive 50bps rate cut at this year's September 18 meeting suggests that he relies on history to guide his decisions.
有很多人估计本南柯吸取了格老98年的教训。（上次直接降息50点就避免了需要分别降两次）。但是本南柯未料到的是，50点的激进降息也直接将他对历史亦步亦趋的行事方针暴露无疑。
**If Bernanke applies the lessons learned from history, he could be more aggressive about cutting rates than markets expect**
- All recessions have been accompanied by construction declines, but not all construction declines resulted in recessions. In both 1967 and 1995, there were year-over-year declines in residential construction, but the U.S. escaped recessions. Several analysts have suggested the reason the 1995 housing slump may not have triggered a recession was that the Fed acted fairly quickly to reverse the effects of the seven Fed funds rate increases from February, 1994, through February, 1995 (6.0% from 3.0%).
- Bernanke would obviously like to avoid a U.S. recession, raising the possibility that he will use the 1995 situation as a blueprint. If Bernanke tries to mimic the Fed reaction in 1995, he could cut rates by another 50bps at this week's meeting. History has shown that, in order to avoid a recession amid a construction slump, interest rates should be cut quickly and aggressively.
如果本南柯直接将历史作为向导，那么他这次降息的幅度很可能再次出乎市场所料。
历史上美国所有的经济萧条都伴随着房地产的下滑，但是并不是所有的地产业下滑都会引起经济的萧条。例如，在1967年和1995年，房产业经历了多年的下滑，但是美国经济躲过了萧条。许多分析表明，1995年的地产业大萧条没有导致经济萧条的原因也许是因为：联储迅速消除了从1994年2月到1995年2月的7次联邦储备金利率上调的影响。（3.0%增加到6%）
本南柯肯定希望避免经济萧条，所以极有可能将1995年的情况来作为参照。如果本南柯想仿照95年联储的做法，那么他可能在本周的会议上再次降息50点。经验表明，为了避免地产下滑引发经济萧条，必须坚决果断的降息。
**Bernanke is not afraid of the damage that a 50bps rate cut would do to the USD**
- On October 15 he said that history suggests that price gains from a weaker dollar are small.
- The weaker USD helps to offset the weakness of the housing market by boosting U.S. exports. It is possible that Bernanke would like the USD to weaken more, especially if he isn't convinced that a weak USD will lead to inflation. A 50bps would materially weaken the USD, boosting U.S. exports and limiting the impact of the housing slowdown.
“本南柯无畏再次50点降息对美元的伤害”
在10月15日，他说：历史证明，廉价美元的代价不大。弱势美元刺激了美国的出口，可以抵消房产低迷带来的影响。本南柯有可能希望美元更弱势一些，特别是他不确信美元低迷会有通胀的危险。再次50点降息会更加削弱美元，再刺激美国出口并且减小房地产下滑的影响。
(by Eben Esterhuizen)
[ 本帖最后由 coollyw 于 2007-10-30 18:04 编辑 ] 谢谢,辛苦了 谢谢 谢谢 ;) 谢谢！ 不错 谢谢:lol: 谢谢版主,辛苦了 :mlw:
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